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I. INTRODUCTION 
The lone scientist, toiling away over a Bunsen burner at midnight or 
huddled in the corner of his garage with a few tools, has long held a 
place in the American psyche. As tempting as this noble image is, the 
truth is often much more mundane. Scientists typically work in groups, 
with ideas flowing among members of the group in an often 
∗Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. J.D., 2006, University of 
Michigan Law School; Ph.D., 2003, University of Virginia, Department of Microbiology. This 
Article is based upon a talk given at the 2015 Akron Law David and Ann Brennan IP Scholars 
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unaccounted for manner, each idea building on the one before. Thus, 
inventions often have multiple inventors, each responsible for a minor 
aspect of the final invention. 
This system of invention is the same model used in the laboratories 
of research universities, colleges, and non-profit research institutions1 
across the country. A faculty member, called a Principal Investigator 
(PI), leads a research team composed of a mix of research scientists, 
post-doctoral fellows, graduate students, and technicians. These research 
teams are responsible for thousands of new inventions across the country 
each year. In order to commercialize these inventions, universities often 
work with commercial entities to provide a means for the further 
development of the university inventions in a process called technology 
transfer.2 
Technology transfer is a complicated dance involving numerous 
players and varied influences. Many universities have created 
technology-transfer offices (TTOs) tasked with choreographing and 
expediting this process. During the last three decades, technology 
transfer has become an economic powerhouse, and universities have 
become essential partners with industry, supplying innovative ideas and 
groundbreaking concepts—and often, patented inventions.3 Technology 
transfer from 191 surveyed institutions produced 2.5 billion dollars in 
royalties from licensing academic research innovations in 2008, likely 
representing 50 to 70 billion dollars in sales of commercialized 
products.4 
One of the most understudied aspects of the technology-transfer 
system is the interrelationship between the various inventors named on a 
patent application resulting from research conducted in these multi-
player laboratories. In a previous paper, I discussed the negotiation 
power imbalance that exists between faculty and non-faculty inventors 
as a factor explaining why non-faculty inventors are not invested in the 
1. For brevity, “university” as used in the remainder of this Article will include research
colleges and non-profit research institutions. 
2. For the purposes of this Article, “technology transfer” is the process by which
innovations from university researchers are licensed or otherwise conveyed to entities that will 
eventually commercialize the innovation. The Association of University Technology Managers 
defines technology transfer as: “Technology transfer is the process of developing and 
commercializing scientific findings and fundamental discoveries into relevant applications.” ASS’N 
OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY: FY2008 7 (Rich Kordal et 
al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter AUTM FY2008]. 
3. Jerry G. Thursby et al., Objectives, Characteristics and Outcomes of University
Licensing: A Survey of Major U.S. Universities, 26 J. TECH. TRANSFER 59, 59 (2001) [hereinafter 
Thursby, Objectives]. 
4. See AUTM FY2008, supra note 2, at 3, 8. 
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technology-transfer system.5 That same negotiation power imbalance 
directly impacts agreements between faculty and non-faculty joint 
inventors as to how to divide patent royalties between them. One such 
royalty sharing agreement recently led to a lawsuit by a former Harvard 
graduate student based on accusations of fraud and coercion and well 
illustrates many of the problems.6 
In June 2013, Dr. Mark Charest, a chemistry PhD student who 
graduated from Harvard in 2004, sued the university along with Andrew 
Myers, his PhD advisor.7 The lawsuit arose due to the royalties 
associated with a patent covering a new synthetic method for producing 
6-deoxytetracycline antibiotics.8 This method became the basis for 
Charest’s dissertation.9 Additionally, in 2005 the Myers Lab published a 
paper in Science that described the method.10 Charest was the first 
author listed on the paper.11 
From those humble research lab inventions, the method became 
monetarily valuable.12 As with all such research inventions, the method 
was assigned to the sponsoring university, in this case, Harvard.13 From 
there, Harvard’s Office of Technology Development (OTD) patented the 
method and sought to license it.14 A company, Tetraphase 
Pharmaceuticals, was started to commercialize the work by licensing the 
tetracycline patent from the university.15 
The distribution of royalties from the Tetraphase license led to the 
current dispute.16 Harvard’s policy requires the university to distribute 
royalties equally among all of the inventors on a patent unless the 
inventors agree to a different distribution.17 Harvard’s OTD asked 
Charest and his former labmates to voluntarily accept a distribution of 
50% to Myers, 15% to Charest, 15% to Dionicio Siegel, 15% to 
Christian Lerner, and 5% to Jason Brubaker (the five co-authors of the 
5. See generally Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Beyond Einstein and Edison: Claiming Space for
Non-Faculty Inventors in Technology Transfer, 47 IND. L. REV. 645 (2014). 
6. See generally Complaint, Charest v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. & Andrew G.
Myers, 2016 WL 614368 (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 2016) (No. 1:13-cv-11556). 
7. Id. at 1-4. 
8. Id. at 4-5. 
9. Id. at 5. 
10. Id. at 4. 
11. Id. at 5. 
12. Id. at 7. 
13. Id. at 5. 
14. Id. at 5-7. 
15. Id. at 7. 
16. Id. at 8-9. 
17. Id. at 8. 
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paper) rather than an equal split of 20% each.18 The four non-faculty co-
authors did not believe this to be an equitable split and agreed amongst 
themselves to a distribution of 18.75% to Charest, 11.25% to Siegel, 
10% to Lerner, and 10% to Brubaker.19 Myers refused to participate in 
the royalty negotiation and maintained that his 50% share was not open 
for discussion.20 
Charest initially refused to accept the unequal distribution of the 
royalties.21 When he began discussions with Harvard’s OTD, Charest 
claimed that Harvard threatened to directly cut Charest’s share of the 
royalties or to shift the distribution of licensing payments to a second 
patent on which Charest was not listed as an inventor.22 In addition, 
Myers pressured Charest to accept the royalty distribution, using advice 
such as “tread lightly,” “be careful,” and “think about [your] career.”23 
In light of the pressure from Harvard and his PhD advisor, Charest 
signed an agreement to accept 18.75% of the royalties for the first 
patent.24 The second patent never materialized, and Charest asserted in 
his complaint his belief that it was a ruse fabricated to force his hand to 
volunteer to let Myers get a 50% cut of the royalties.25 Additionally, 
Myers refused to serve as a reference when Charest applied for a 
position after graduate school, going so far as to not return phone calls 
when a potential employer directly contacted Myers regarding Charest.26 
The Charest case highlights important issues in royalty sharing 
agreements. First, faculty and students are likely to value their own 
individual contributions differently—and perhaps not based on 
inventorship definitions in patent law. Second, students are likely to 
capitulate to university and faculty demands (even if under protest) and 
wait until after graduation to bring any lawsuit. Such actions by students 
are highly indicative of the negotiation power imbalance between faculty 
and non-faculty inventors. This Article thoroughly discusses the issues 
that arise in technology transfer and invention disclosure. Even with 
these ever-present issues, universities should not ignore the revenue 
sharing requirements set forth in the Bayh-Dole Act and should 
implement a revenue sharing policy and an accompanying dispute 
18. Id. 
19. Id. at 9. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 10. 
22. Id. at 10-11. 
23. Id. at 10. 
24. Id. at 12. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 10. 
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resolution policy in order to ensure that licensing revenues are shared 
equitably among the joint inventors. 
This Article explores basic problems of the university technology-
transfer process and its cumulative impact on revenue sharing and the 
technology-transfer process as a whole. Part II overviews university 
technology-transfer history and process, including a discussion of the 
history and purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act and the role of technology-
transfer offices. Part III recounts the problems with incentivizing 
invention disclosure by university inventors as well as defining 
inventorship and ownership under patent law, along with the associated 
problems encountered by universities. Part IV discusses the Bayh-Dole 
revenue sharing requirements and explains that the problems 
encountered in Part III are similarly important in the revenue sharing 
context before discussing possible revenue sharing policies for 
universities. 
II. UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER OVERVIEW
University scientific research spans the gamut from basic research27 
to applications of technology ready for commercialization. What ties 
much of this research together is a reliance on federal funding. The 
reliance on federal funding led Congress to be concerned that taxpayers 
were receiving fair returns on the research investments and to pass the 
Bayh-Dole Act, which governs the intellectual property rights of 
inventions created during the course of federally funded research. The 
history and purpose of the Bayh-Dole Act is discussed in more detail in 
Part II.A. The regulations and incentives of the Bayh-Dole Act in turn 
led universities to create technology-transfer offices to handle the 
intellectual property relating to those university inventions. Part II.B 
focuses on technology-transfer offices and their roles in technology 
transfer. 
A. History of the Bayh-Dole Act 
While patent rights generally exist to encourage invention and 
enable disclosure to the public,28 before 1980, federally funded 
university research lacked the rewards for either inventors or 
universities. Many funding agencies assumed that ownership of such 
27. As used in this Article, basic scientific research is that research designed to improve
understanding of fundamental principles, relationships, and workings of the natural world. The main 
goal of basic scientific research is understanding, rather than the creation of a commercial product. 
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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innovations belonged with the funding agency itself,29 due to a lack of 
uniform federal policy defining the ownership of innovations resulting 
from federally funded research.30 Therefore, researchers using federal 
funds had no incentives to disclose created innovations other than in 
publications that resulted in the dedication of the inventions to the 
intellectual commons. Additionally, those inventions from basic research 
that were patented tended to be vastly under-utilized. Of the 
approximately 30,000 patents held by the United States Government, 
only five percent were licensed out to private industry.31 One goal of the 
Bayh-Dole Act was to create incentives to drive the commercialization 
of academic innovations.32 
The Bayh-Dole Act defines the uniform federal patent policy for 
agencies that fund university research. One stated policy of the Bayh-
Dole Act is “to promote the utilization of inventions arising from 
federally supported research or development.”33 The Bayh-Dole Act 
accomplishes this policy, in part, by giving universities the option to 
take title to any invention created by federal funding34 and to 
commercialize those inventions through licensing. This process 
incentivizes universities to commercialize inventions by allowing them 
to collect licensing revenues. Recognizing that inventors would need 
incentives to disclose their inventions to the universities, the Bayh-Dole 
Act also required universities to share a portion of that licensing revenue 
with the inventors.35 
The passage of the Bayh-Dole Act in 1980 spurred acceleration of 
university technology transfer. In 1980, there were approximately two 
dozen technology-transfer offices (TTOs) at universities across the 
United States; today, technology transfer has grown such that almost 
29. See, e.g., Bhaven N. Sampat, Patenting and US Academic Research in the 20th Century: 
The World Before and After Bayh-Dole, 35 RES. POL’Y 772, 776-77 (2006). 
30. John E. Tyler III, Advancing University Innovation: More Must be Expected—More Must 
be Done, 10 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 143, 146 (2009). 
31. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., MANAGING UNIVERSITY 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 16 (Stephen A. Merrill & Anne-Marie Mazza 
eds., 2011). 
32. Bayh-Dole Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015, 3019-29 (codified at 35
U.S.C. §§ 200-212). For a full description of the history leading up to the implementation of the 
Bayh-Dole Act, see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and 
Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1671-95 (1996). 
33. 35 U.S.C.A. § 200 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 114-
94, and 114-113) 2016). 
34. 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 114-
94, and 114-113) 2016).  
35. 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(c)(7)(B) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-
92, 114-94, and 114-113) 2016). 
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every major research institution has a TTO.36 A 2009 Association of 
University Technology Managers survey of 179 technology-transfer 
offices reported 12,109 new patent applications were filed and over 
5,300 licenses were granted.37 Licensing revenues had grown to 
approximately 2.3 billion dollars in 2009, as compared to about 1 billion 
dollars of total licensing revenue in 2000.38 
B. Role of the Technology-Transfer Office 
The increased numbers of patent applications and licenses reported 
are due to the operation of the university technology-transfer process, 
which begins well before the TTO becomes involved. The technology-
transfer process begins with invention in the university research 
laboratory. The large cast of the university research laboratory includes 
faculty researchers, termed “Principal Investigators” who lead the 
research group or laboratory, non-tenure track faculty research 
associates, post-doctoral fellows, graduate students, and technicians.39 
Project funding leads to inventions that the academic researchers, as the 
inventors, must disclose to the university’s TTO. Generally, the inventor 
is required to fill out a disclosure form providing basic information 
about the invention, relevant funding, and inventor identification.40 
Once the TTO receives the disclosure, it determines whether to 
patent and license the invention based on market analysis and 
patentability searches.41 Upon determination that patent protection is 
appropriate, the TTO begins the patent prosecution process and attempts 
to license the invention. The TTO distributes revenues from the licenses 
back to the university to fund further research and support other 
university educational and administrative functions. Importantly, a 
36. See Gideon D. Markman et al., Entrepreneurship From the Ivory Tower: Do Incentive
Systems Matter?, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 353, 353 (2004). 
37. See ASS’N OF UNIV. TECH. MANAGERS, AUTM U.S. LICENSING ACTIVITY SURVEY: 
FY2009 25, 34 (Rich Kordal et al. eds., 2010). 
38. Id. at 37. 
39. For a fuller description of the research laboratory, see Jennifer Carter-Johnson, Unveiling 
the Distinction Between the University and Its Academic Researchers: Lessons for Patent 
Infringement and University Technology Transfer, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 473, 478-80 
(2010). 
40. There are two types of disclosure often mentioned in relation to university research: (1)
disclosure by the inventor to the university and (2) disclosure by the university to the relevant 
governmental funding agency. For the purposes of this paper, “disclosure” will refer to disclosure 
by the inventor of an invention to the university TTO. 
41. See AUTM FY2008, supra note 2, at 21 (“Once the technology transfer office receives
the innovations in the form of disclosures, it assesses each disclosure for commercial potential, 
novelty, potential for startup opportunity, and pre-existing obligations.”). 
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portion of the licensing revenue is distributed to the inventors as 
incentives to encourage invention and invention disclosure to the 
university.42 
III. TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER PROBLEMS GENERALLY
At least three related problem points should be highlighted in the 
technology-transfer process. Invention disclosure is an important 
requirement in order to begin the process, but without university 
researcher support, no such disclosures occur. Once disclosed, university 
researchers must identify the inventors for patent procurement. 
Unfortunately, inventor identification is an area that is more difficult 
than it first appears. Finally, in order to distribute licensing revenue, the 
relative proportion of inventorship, a mutual agreement among the 
inventors, or some other method must be employed to determine revenue 
allocation among inventors. This allocation mechanism is a little 
researched area of technology-transfer, but is fraught with many of the 
same difficulties as the first two areas. 
Therefore, in order to understand the issues raised by revenue 
allocation, it is also helpful to review the literature associated with the 
first two problems. Part III.A fully discusses the issues with 
incentivizing invention disclosure and outlines the incentives and 
disincentives of invention disclosure in Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2, 
respectively. Part III.B discusses the issues involved in defining 
inventorship, including a discussion of patent ownership and who an 
inventor actually is in Part III.B.1 and a discussion of inventorship issues 
specifically in the university setting in Part III.B.2. 
A. Problem One: Incentivizing Invention Disclosure 
Much has been written about inventor disclosure in the university 
technology-transfer process. The underlying basis of the university 
technology-transfer system relies on inventor researchers to disclose 
patentable and licensable innovations—otherwise the innovations are 
generally published in scientific journals and thus dedicated to the public 
domain. However, faculty support of the technology-transfer process has 
lagged behind university investment for myriad reasons. 
42. The Bayh-Dole Act requires non-profit organizations such as universities to share with
the inventors some portion of the royalties obtained by the licensing of federally funded inventions. 
35 U.S.C. § 202 (c)(7)(B) requires that funding agreements include as provisions “a requirement 
that the contractor share royalties with the inventor.” 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(c)(7)(B) (West, Westlaw 
through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 114-94, and 114-113) 2016). 
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In support of the technology-transfer system, most university 
policies include a duty to disclose and to assign title to inventions, and 
universities require researchers to agree to these policies as a term of 
employment—including employment as student research assistants.43 
Non-employee researchers, such as graduate students and sometimes 
even undergraduate students, are generally subject to similar policies in 
which the university claims title to any inventions developed using 
university resources.44 
Despite a contractual duty to disclose and the possibility of 
monetary revenue, as many as 50% of patentable innovations are not 
disclosed by researchers to their university’s TTO.45 Such disregard for 
the duty to disclose suggests an imbalance between incentives to 
disclose and other influences on researchers. The disclosure incentive is 
generally monetary—a slice of the licensing revenues, as is required by 
the Bayh-Dole Act for federally funded inventions.46 On the other hand, 
incentives to ignore disclosure requirements are varied and include 
social norms, time-management issues, and a lack of education about the 
duty and the monetary incentives. 
1. Disclosure Incentives
University intellectual property policies generally provide for 
43. See, e.g., The University of Michigan Technology Transfer Policy, THE UNIVERSITY OF
MICHIGAN (June 1, 2009), http://www.techtransfer.umich.edu/resources/policies.php; James D. 
Clements, Improving Bayh-Dole: A Case for Inventor Ownership of Federally Sponsored Research 
Patents, 49 IDEA 469, 500-01 (2009). 
44. There is debate as to the ability of the university to claim ownership of student-created 
inventions in certain contexts, such as inventions created during a class. This Article is limited to 
inventorship in the context of a university research laboratory, which typically means that the 
student is also acting, in many ways, as an employee of the university and using substantial 
university resources. For more information on the debate, see Sean B. Seymore, My Patent, Your 
Patent, or Our Patent? Inventorship Disputes Within Academic Research Groups, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI.
& TECH. 125, 137 (2006); and Anthony J. Luppino, Fixing a Hole: Eliminating Ownership 
Uncertainties to Facilitate University-Generated Innovation, 78 UMKC L. REV. 367, 377-78, 383-
84 (2009). 
45. See Richard A. Jensen, Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Disclosure and Licensing 
of University Inventions: ‘The Best We Can Do with the S**t We Get to Work With’, 21 INT’L J.
INDUS. ORG. 1271, 1272 (2003); Jerry G. Thursby & Marie C. Thursby, Pros and Cons of Faculty 
Participation in Licensing, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: 
PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (ADVANCES IN THE STUDY OF 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH) 187, 189 (Gary D. Libecap ed., 
2005) [hereinafter Thursby, Pros and Cons]; Albert N. Link, Donald S. Siegel & Barry Bozeman, 
An Empirical Analysis of the Propensity of Academics to Engage in Informal University Technology 
Transfer, 16 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 641, 642-43 (2007). 
46. See generally 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 200-204 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding
P.L. 114-92, 114-94, and 114-113) 2016). 
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inventors, both faculty and non-faculty, to receive a share of the 
licensing revenue derived from their invention as an incentive for 
disclosure. The average distribution of revenue to the inventors is a 40% 
share of the net licensing revenue.47 However, the policies differ greatly 
on the percentage awarded to each party and whether those percentages 
are stable or variable according to the amount of licensing revenue 
generated by the invention.48 
Some scholars have suggested that monetary incentives are less 
effective than other types of incentives in the academic research world. 
These scholars suggest that academic researchers are more interested in 
the secure employment of tenure, intellectual freedom, and recognition 
of their peers.49 While these non-monetary goals and interests are 
dependent on grant funding for research and a stream of publications, 
they are not inconsistent with monetary incentives. Indeed, many 
scholars have used empirical methods to model the effect of 
incentivization of faculty researchers through share of licensing revenue. 
In general, these studies conclude that monetary incentives have at least 
some positive impact on disclosures.50 However, some studies have 
shown little or no positive impact of revenue sharing with researchers. It 
is likely that faculty response to monetary incentives varies across 
institutions based on the strength of the competing disincentives to 
disclose. 
47. Thursby, Objectives, supra note 3, at 61. 
48. For a detailed description of two major university revenue sharing policies, see generally
Carter-Johnson, supra note 5. 
49. DANIEL S. GREENBERG, SCIENCE FOR SALE: THE PERILS, REWARDS AND DELUSIONS OF
CAMPUS CAPITALISM 22-23 (2007). See generally Katherine J. Strandburg, Curiosity-Driven 
Research and University Technology Transfer, in 16 UNIVERSITY ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: PROCESS, DESIGN, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (ADVANCES IN THE 
STUDY OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP, INNOVATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH) 93, 99-104 (Gary D. 
Libecap ed., 2005). 
50. See, e.g., Donald S. Siegel, David Waldman & Albert Link, Assessing the Impact of
Organizational Practices on the Relative Productivity of University Technology Transfer Offices: 
An Exploratory Study, 32 RES. POL’Y 27, 44-45 (2003); Joseph Friedman & Jonathan Silberman, 
University Technology Transfer: Do Incentives, Management and Location Matter?, 28 J. TECH.
TRANSFER 17, 29 (2003) (showing a positive but weak correlation of license revenue share 
incentives to faculty researchers with the number of licenses executed, and a strong correlation with 
license income. This discrepancy may be due to a skewing of the data by one or more “blockbuster” 
inventions or could also be due to limits on TTO resources to execute more licenses.); Albert N. 
Link & Donald S. Siegel, Generating Science-Based Growth: An Economic Analysis of the Impact 
of Organizational Incentives on University-Industry Technology Transfer, 11 EUR. J. FIN. 169, 179 
(2005); Thursby, Pros and Cons, supra note 45, at 192; Saul Lach & Mark Schankerman, Incentives 
and Invention in Universities, 39 RAND J. ECON. 403, 404 (2008) (showing that license revenue 
sharing with scientists strongly affects licensing outcomes). 
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2. Disincentives to Disclosure
Arrayed against these monetary incentives to disclose are a number 
of pressures inherent in the academic research environment. Social 
norms, lack of education, and a perception that time is better spent 
elsewhere all work together to offset the potential monetary incentive to 
disclose.51 
University scientists work in a community that was built on the free 
sharing of ideas through publications, conferences, and open discussion. 
The social norms surrounding this community have made it difficult to 
convince university scientists that participating in the technology-
transfer process is valuable as many of these norms conflict with 
technology transfer.52 For example, patents result in exclusivity rights 
which restrict use of an invention. Publication may also be delayed to 
file a patent. While current U.S. patent law allows a one year grace 
period after research publication but before patent application,53 the 
patent laws of many other countries have an absolute publication bar 
upon any publication of the innovation before the patent application.54 
Therefore, academic researchers may fear that disclosure of innovations 
to the university TTO will result in requirements to delay publication or 
conference presentations so that patent applications can be timely filed.55 
Additionally, scientists often lack education about patent law and 
51. For a full discussion of the disincentives to disclose, see generally Carter-Johnson, supra 
note 5. 
52. See, e.g., Thursby, Pros and Cons, supra note 45, at 189 (“[S]ome faculty may refuse to
disclose for ‘philosophical’ reasons related to their notions of the proper role of academic scientists 
and engineers.”); Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Rights and the Norms of Science in 
Biotechnology Research, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999) (discussing changes in scientific norms 
within the biotechnology research community); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Bayh-Dole 
Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 289-90 (2003) 
(discussing the erosion of ‘open science’ norms resulting at least in part from the encouragement of 
university patenting of basic biomedical research). For a comprehensive discussion of the debate 
over the existence and effects on scientific norms on technology transfer, see generally Charles R. 
McManis & Sucheol Noh, The Impact of the Bayh-Dole Act on Genetic Research and Development: 
Evaluating the Arguments and Empirical Research to Date, in PERSPECTIVES ON
COMMERCIALIZING INNOVATION (F. Scott Kieff & Troy A. Paredes eds., 2012). 
53. 35 U.S.C.A. § 102(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 
114-94, and 114-113) 2016). 
54. See generally Certain Aspects of National/Regional Patent Laws: Grace Period, WIPO 
(Nov. 2015), http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/scp/en/national_laws/grace_period.pdf 
(describing grace periods for publication, or the lack of the same, in Europe and other countries). 
55. See, e.g., Intellectual Property Policy, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY IN ST. LOUIS, (Oct. 1,
2014), https://wustl.edu/about/compliance-policies/intellectual-property-research-policies/
intellectual-property/ (“The publication of research results must not be hampered by agreements 
made to commercialize intellectual property. However, a minimal and defined delay to protect 
intellectual property through patent applications may be included.”). 
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technology transfer generally. Scientists may lack knowledge about the 
legal definition of an invention or inventorship as well the steps required 
to disclose an invention to the TTO. Academic researchers do not 
instinctively understand when a patentable invention has been created or 
even recognize the existence of the duty to disclose an invention. To the 
extent that the time pressures discussed below exist, academic 
researchers are unlikely to find time to educate themselves if they lack 
an underlying understanding of the importance of technology transfer. 
Finally, aside from social norms and technology-transfer education, 
the simple balancing of the time investment necessary for disclosure and 
the expectations of recoupment may weigh against disclosure. For many 
academic researchers, this balancing of time commitments may weigh 
strongly in favor of failing to disclose. Once a faculty researcher creates 
a new technology, she must determine the best use of the technology and 
her time in order to continue to receive more funding and job stability 
such as tenure. Monetary gain in the distant future may not outweigh a 
publication or further grant writing.56 Similarly, post-doctoral 
researchers and graduate students must make a trade-off between 
publication and its concomitant career advancement and the time needed 
for disclosure.57 
B. Problem Two: Determining Inventorship 
Once the university researchers have made the decision to disclose, 
the next hurdle in the technology-transfer process is to determine who 
should be a named inventor on the patent. As noted above, lack of 
education in this process may indeed be a disincentive for disclosure in 
the first place. Perhaps more importantly, lack of education combined 
with inherent biases in the research community may result in the 
omission of inventors from a patent application. 
1. Defining Inventorship
To understand the problems with invention determination in the 
university technology-transfer process, it is important to understand 
inventorship and the underlying patent laws. Under U.S. patent law, 
56. Daniel W. Elfenbein, Publications, Patents, and the Market for University Inventions, 63 
J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 688, 689 (2007); Jensen, Thursby & Thursby, supra note 45, at 1272. 
57. For a full discussion of why non-faculty researchers are unlikely to be incentivized by the 
technology-transfer system and suggestions to include them in the process, see generally Carter-
Johnson, supra note 5 and Luppino, supra note 44. 
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ownership of a patent initially vests in the inventor.58 The Federal 
Circuit has used strong language to make that point, holding that by 
default, “an invention presumptively belongs to its creator”59 and that 
inventor ownership is a “bedrock tenet of patent law.”60 Therefore, the 
naming of the inventor on a patent defines ownership of the patent as 
well as who needs to transfer the rights of the patented technologies to 
the university for licensing.61 
In Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., the Federal Circuit 
explained that conception of the invention is what determines 
inventorship.62 The Federal Circuit held that “[c]onception is the 
formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea 
of the complete and operative invention, as it is hereafter to be applied in 
practice.”63 
Conception does not need to be one person, but rather, multiple 
people can qualify as inventor. Joint inventorship has been defined as 
“the product of a collaboration between two or more persons working 
together to solve the problem addressed.”64 However, it is not always 
easy to determine if two researchers are joint inventors. Multiple 
researchers can be joint inventors on a patent even if “(1) they did not 
physically work together or at the same time, (2) each did not make the 
same type or amount of contribution, or (3) each did not make a 
contribution to the subject matter of every claim of the patent.”65 Each 
person only has to perform “part of the task which produces the 
invention,”66 but one cannot be considered a joint inventor if they 
58. 35 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 114-
94, and 114-113) 2016). See generally DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 2.01 (1978). 
59. Teets v. Chromalloy Gas Turbine Corp., 83 F.3d 403, 407 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
60. Isr. Bio-Eng’g Project v. Amgen, Inc., 475 F.3d 1256, 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
61. Previously only the inventor could file a patent application. However, section 4 of the
America Invents Act provides that applications filed after September 16, 2012 may be filed by the 
inventor, the inventor’s assignee, or anyone to whom the inventor is obliged to assign the patent, 
even if the assignment has not yet been executed. Donald S. Chisum, America Invents Act of 2011: 
Analysis and Cross-References, CHISUM PATENT ACADEMY 41-42 (Dec. 5, 2011), available at 
www.chisum.com/wp-content/uploads/AIAOverview.pdf. For an overview of problems in 
conception and inventorship, see Aaron X. Fellmeth, Conception and Misconception in Joint 
Inventorship, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 73 (2012). 
62. 135 F.3d 1456, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
63. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d. 1223, 
1227-28 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Conception is the touchstone of inventorship . . . .”). 
64. Burroughs Wellcome, 40 F.3d. at 1227. 
65. 35 U.S.C.A. § 116(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 114-
94, and 114-113) 2016). 
66. Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1460. 
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merely assisted the inventor after conception or provided the inventor 
with basic principles and explanations of the art.67 
A patent usually contains multiple claims, each relating to a 
different aspect of the invention. Therefore, a patented invention can be, 
and often is, attributed to several inventors, each of which must have 
contributed conceptually to at least one of the claims in the patent.68 
Additionally, since the conceived invention changes over time, initial 
conception is often not an indication of all of the inventors.69 
Failure to denote an inventor can be quite serious, though recent 
changes have made omissions less problematic. Before the passing of § 
256 of the Patent Act in 1952, all errors regarding the addition or 
removal of an inventor caused the patent to be invalid.70 Passage of § 
256 allowed for changes to the listed inventors.71 Under § 256, removing 
an inventor from an issued patent could be accomplished with no regard 
as to how that person became named in the first place.72 However, to add 
an inventor to an issued patent, no deceptive intent on the part of the 
non-named inventor was allowed.73 Most recently, the passage of the 
America Invents Act (AIA) significantly altered the language of § 256.74 
The requirement that the error arise without deceptive intent was 
removed.75 This strongly increases the rights of patentees because they 
67. Sewall v. Walters, 21 F.3d 411, 415-16 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Hess v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys. Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 981 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
68. See 35 U.S.C.A. § 116(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 
114-94, and 114-113) 2016); Ethicon, 135 F.3d at 1548 (“[E]ach joint inventor must generally 
contribute to the conception of the invention.”). 
69. For a full discussion of how to determine patent inventorship, see generally Christopher
McDavid, I Want a Piece of That! How the Current Joint Inventorship Laws Deal with Minor 
Contributions to Inventions, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 449 (2010). 
70. Iowa State Univ. Research Found., Inc., v. Sperry Rand Corp., 444 F.2d 406, 408 (4th
Cir. 1971). 
71. Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, § 256, 66 Stat. 792, 810 (1952) (codified at 35
U.S.C. § 256). 
72. Patent Act of 1952 § 256. 
73. The actual language of § 256 makes this clear: 
Whenever through error a person is named in an issued patent as the inventor, or through 
error an inventor is not named in an issued patent and such error arose without any de-
ceptive intention on his part, the Director may, on application of all the parties and as-
signees, with proof of the facts and such other requirements as may be imposed, issued a 
certificate correcting such error. 
Patent Act of 1952 of § 256 (emphasis added). 
74. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 20, 125 Stat. 284, 334 (2011)
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 256); Manual of Patent Examining Procedure § 1481.02: Correction of 
Named Inventor, THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/s1481.html. 
75. 35 U.S.C.A § 256 (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 114-94, 
and 114-113) 2016). 
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no longer have to defend accusations of deceptive behavior when 
attempting to cure the inventorship defects in a patent. 
2. Importance of Inventorship to Universities
While ownership of a patent initially vests with an inventor or joint 
inventors, the Bayh-Dole Act gives universities the right to “elect to 
retain title to any subject invention.”76 Until recently, many assumed that 
this provision implied automatic vesting of ownership of federally 
funded inventions to the university rather than through assignment by 
the inventor.77 This assumption was rejected recently in Stanford v. 
Roche.78 
In Roche, Mark Holodniy, hired as a research fellow at Stanford 
University, had signed Stanford’s “Copyright and Patent Agreement” 
obligating him to assign any inventions and related intellectual property 
to Stanford University.79 He later signed a “Visitor’s Confidentiality 
Agreement” with Cetus [Roche] that provided that Holodniy “do[es] 
hereby assign to Cetus” the “right, title and interest in each of the ideas, 
inventions and improvements” that he developed during his work at 
Cetus—including the PCR-based HIV detection assay he later 
developed.80 
Years later, Stanford sued Roche for patent infringement based on 
the Holodniy patents.81 Roche countered that Stanford did not own the 
patents because Holodniy’s Visitor’s Confidentiality Agreement 
contained an assignment of the PCR-based invention because the assay 
was based on technology that Holodniy learned while at Cetus.82 The 
Federal Circuit agreed with Roche, noting that Stanford’s prior 
Copyright and Patent Agreement merely held a contractual obligation to 
assign rather than an actual assignment.83 Holodniy may have breached 
76. 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(a) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-92, 114-
94, and 114-113) 2016). 
77. See, e.g., Friedman & Silberman, supra note 50, at 18 (“The Bayh-Dole act requires
university’s faculty members, students or staff members who recognize or discover a new 
technology or invention that has commercialization potential to disclose the invention to their 
institution’s Technology Transfer Office (TTO).”). 
78. Bd. of Tr. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct.
2188, 2199 (2011). 
79. Id. at 2192. 
80. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id. at 2193. 
82. Id. 
83. See Bd. of Tr. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583
F.3d 832, 841-42 (Fed. Cir. 2009). This issue was not reviewed by the Supreme Court. See Leland 
Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2194. 
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his contractual obligation to Stanford, but the first assignment of the 
technology went to Cetus. The Supreme Court held that the source of 
funding did not affect ownership of the resulting patent and that even 
though the PCR assay was developed with federal funding under the 
Bayh-Dole Act, ownership rights continued to vest initially with the 
inventor.84 Therefore, because Holodniy first assigned his patent rights 
to Cetus, he had no rights left to assign to Stanford. As a result of this 
holding, universities must acquire a valid patent assignment agreement 
in order to have the authority to transfer ownership rights. 
In light of the Roche decision, patent rights initially vest in 
inventors—even those using federal funds to invent. Therefore, 
universities must rely on inventors to assign patent applications and 
assignments. Without inventor cooperation, the university cannot 
procure the needed patents or oversee the licensing of technologies 
created within its walls.85 
It can be difficult for a scientific researcher to determine who 
should be included as an inventor. Problems in the technology-transfer 
process may arise due to ambiguities in inventorship. Due to the 
definition of inventorship and the complexities of the modern university 
research environment, inventions often include conceptual and creative 
contributions by many people building on an initial idea. Unfortunately, 
universities often leave the determination of inventorship, especially 
during the disclosure stage, to the researchers themselves. Because these 
researchers lack patent law training, their designation of joint inventors 
may be legally incorrect, resulting in improper patent prosecution and 
assignments. If the TTO fails to list a joint inventor on a patent and get 
an assignment, that joint inventor may later sue to claim her patent rights 
and potentially license those rights in competition with the university. 
Problems associated with the failure to list an inventor can be 
exacerbated because it is not uncommon for faculty researchers to deny 
that non-faculty members, particularly graduate and undergraduate 
students, are inventors. Some faculty researchers have blatantly made 
declarations to the United States Patent and Trademark Office declaring 
themselves the sole inventor despite several graduate student and post-
doctoral researcher co-authors on the very papers at the base of the 
innovation86 or declaring that all innovative work in the lab came from 
84. Leland Stanford, 131 S. Ct. at 2195-99. 
85. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 202(a), 202(c) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L.
114-92, 114-94, and 114-113) 2016). 
86. See Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Seymore, supra note 
44, at 147. 
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faculty.87 Even legal scholars look to faculty inventors suggesting that 
the requirement that graduate students have faculty advisors for research 
topics implies a lack of conceptual creativity on the part of those 
students.88 
This attitude of many faculty inventors causes real problems. For 
example in Chou v. University of Chicago, Joany Chou’s faculty advisor 
failed to name her as an inventor on a patent and fired her when she 
pressed her claim for inventorship.89 After leaving the laboratory, Dr. 
Chou sued her faculty advisor, the University of Chicago, and ARCH 
Development Corporation, the University of Chicago’s licensing arm, 
for correction of inventorship in order to have her name added to the 
patent as a joint inventor so that she could receive a portion of the 
licensing revenue.90 On appeal, the Federal Circuit held that Dr. 
Roizman had a fiduciary duty to his student with regards to giving her 
credit as joint inventor on the patent application.91 
These sorts of problems between faculty and non-faculty inventors 
can be viewed as power imbalances that affect the ability of the non-
faculty inventor to negotiate inventorship credit and a share of the 
licensing revenue.92 In negotiations between faculty researchers and 
those non-faculty researchers working in their laboratories, this power 
imbalance is often exacerbated. More so than in many employment 
situations, the faculty researcher holds a great deal of power over the 
future career prospects of post-doctoral fellows and students in their 
laboratories. Due to the apprentice-like structure of graduate science 
programs, the faculty member controls degree prospects of students and 
publishing abilities of both students and post-doctoral fellows. For the 
non-faculty researcher, this relationship makes bargaining for 
inventorship credit and splits of revenue problematic as the faulty 
member has a great amount of perceived power over the non-faculty 
researcher. This extreme perceived power imbalance may result in the 
87. CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK? BATTLING FOR CONTROL OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 183 (2001) (quoting a faculty researcher describing inventorship in his 
laboratory: “I think there’s rarely more than one inventor . . . if you wake up and you have an idea, 
that’s the invention . . . . The postdoctoral researchers contributed to the work [around the idea], but 
they didn’t do any really innovative work such as contributing new concepts, [or] coming up with 
something that, in my lab, I haven’t thought about.”). 
88. See, e.g., Clements, supra note 43, at 497 (suggesting that graduate students need receive
no incentives to invent beyond their yearly stipend, perhaps due to the idea that faculty members are 
the true inventors within the laboratory). 
89. 254 F.3d at 1353-54. 
90. Id. at 1354. 
91. Id. at 1362-63. 
92. Carter-Johnson, supra note 5, at 676. 
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avoidance of conflict and lack of disclosure by non-faculty researchers.93 
IV. REVENUE SHARING ALLOCATIONS IN UNIVERSITIES
Once an invention is disclosed to a university, the inventorship 
issues are resolved, and a patent is issued to the university, the invention 
may be licensed for commercialization. Revenue from licensing the 
patent must be shared with the inventors in order to comply with the 
Bayh-Dole Act. In order to distribute licensing revenue, the relative 
proportion of inventorship, a mutual agreement among the inventors, or 
some other method must be employed to determine revenue allocation 
among inventors. This allocation mechanism is a little-researched area of 
technology transfer. Part IV.A reviews the revenue sharing requirements 
of the Bayh-Dole Act and how the competing interests of inventors can 
affect the revenue sharing. Finally, Part IV.B suggests revenue sharing 
policies that universities can implement in an attempt to curb revenue 
sharing issues among inventors. 
A. Problem Three: Determining Revenue Sharing Allocations 
After disclosure and licensing, fortunate universities and inventors 
will receive revenue based on the patented inventions. These revenues 
are shared amongst all named inventors on the patent due to Bayh-Dole 
Act requirements. However, the Bayh-Dole Act does not specify how to 
allocate the revenues between joint inventors. Technology-transfer 
policies and negotiations between joint inventors determine the 
allocation but raise many of the same issues seen with disclosure and 
inventorship determinations discussed above. 
1. Revenue Sharing Requirements
As described above, the Bayh-Dole Act requires universities to 
share proceeds from the licensing of patents with the inventor.94 
However, neither the Bayh-Dole Act nor its implementing regulations 
define how such revenue must be shared with any given inventor even 
though the Code of Federal Regulations specifically recognizes that co-
inventors exist by including reference to federal employee co-inventors 
in the revenue sharing requirements.95 Since many university patents 
93. Id. 
94. 35 U.S.C.A. § 202(c)(7)(B) (West, Westlaw through P.L. 114-114 (excluding P.L. 114-
92, 114-94, and 114-113) 2016). 
95. 37 C.F.R. § 401.14(k)(2) (2016) states that “[t]he contractor will share royalties collected
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have multiple named joint inventors, this revenue sharing requirement 
necessitates that the university and/or inventors determine an allocation 
mechanism for revenue amongst multiple competing interests. 
University technology-transfer policies typically set out the portion 
of the revenue for the inventors as a group.96 These policies may also set 
out the mechanism for revenue allocation amongst the inventors. For 
example, from our Charest example in the Introduction,97 Harvard’s 
policy required all joint inventors to agree to a revenue sharing 
agreement or default to an equal division of the royalties.98 
As in Charest, problems may arise when universities ignore the 
stated policy. For instance, both Harvard and the Principal Investigator 
(PI) believed that the PI should have 50% of the royalties leaving the 
other four non-faculty joint inventors to share the remaining 50%.99 
When Charest disagreed, preferring the default 20% division, Harvard 
stepped in and pushed for the agreement in spite of its policy to the 
contrary.100 
Thus, university technology-transfer policies, while almost 
completely discretionary, need to be a statement of the true university 
policy. These policies should address the competing interests of the 
various parties to the technology-transfer process, recognizing that all 
inventors are not a monolithic group.101 
2. Competing Interests and Attitudes
To understand the best way to allocate revenue among joint 
inventors, it is important to understand the attitudes and interests of the 
various parties. Joint inventors may be any combination of laboratory 
members described above—faculty members, graduate students, post-
doctoral fellows, to name a few. Many of the issues described in the 
technology-transfer problem points above also permeate the discussion 
of revenue allocation. 
The monetary incentives geared toward disclosure are more 
immediate when discussing revenue allocation. An individual inventor 
on a subject invention with the inventor, including Federal employee co-inventors” (emphasis 
added) but does not specify how those royalties should be divided. 
96. Thursby, Objectives, supra note 3, at 61. 
97. See supra notes 6-26 and accompanying text.
98. Complaint at 8, Charest v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll. & Andrew G. Myers,
2016 WL 614368 (D. Mass. Feb. 16, 2016) (No. 1:13-cv-11556). 
99. Id. at 8-9. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Carter-Johnson, supra note 5, at 670. 
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trying to determine her fair revenue allocation based upon her 
contribution would likely have immediate monetary incentive to assess 
her contribution. However, as in the disclosure context, the monetary 
incentives may not offset other pressures on an individual to minimize 
her contribution. 
For example, a graduate student who is a joint inventor with her PI 
is likely to face several pressures to minimize her revenue allocation 
similar to the battles fought for recognition of inventor status. Unlike 
inventorship, there are no legal rules requiring any particular revenue 
allocation for a named inventor. Fairness and equity are the best 
arguments for sharing revenue above a minimum amount. 
Unfortunately, equitable distribution may be a difficult argument if 
the faculty inventor has trouble believing the graduate student is a joint 
inventor. As discussed above, university researchers are not educated as 
to the rules concerning inventorship. This lack of education may result in 
overestimation of some contributions to the invention with concomitant 
underestimation of other contributions. Due to a lack of education, these 
mis-estimations are likely exacerbated by claim amendments during 
prosecution that narrow the scope of the disclosed invention. 
Additionally, many faculty members may have a hard time believing 
that graduate students contribute inventive ideas. This attitude further 
diminishes any estimated allocation due to the graduate student. 
Negotiating a revenue allocation under those circumstances can be 
quite difficult when views of contribution are not matched. Making the 
revenue allocation agreement more difficult is the negotiation power 
imbalance that exists between the faculty and non-faculty inventors.102 
Even an immediate monetary incentive is unlikely to overcome a 
graduate student’s reluctance to anger her PI when project assignments 
and future recommendations are more valuable in the long term. 
With these competing interests and power imbalances in mind, 
universities must determine how to equitably define a distribution of 
revenue amongst the joint inventors. However, due to the lack of 
guidance from the Bayh-Dole Act, the definition of equitable could have 
different meanings to each university. 
B. Defining an “Equitable” Revenue Distribution 
To be clear, neither the Bayh-Dole Act nor the CFR requires an 
“equitable” sharing among joint inventors, merely that the revenue be 
102.  Id. at 676. 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss3/2
2016] INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REVENUE SHARING 667 
shared with them. It might be argued that a token amount of money 
could be given to a joint inventor, but this would seem to call into 
question the spirit of the statutory requirement, if not the specific 
language. More problematically, there could well be different views as 
to what constitutes an equitable revenue distribution among joint 
inventors. University policies could differ widely and still be considered 
equitable based on a number of factors. 
The first potential revenue distribution policy would be to share the 
inventor portion of the revenue equally amongst all named joint 
inventors on a patent. Such a policy mirrors aligning the revenue sharing 
with the initial patent ownership since all joint inventors are considered 
to be equal owners of the patent. However, an equal revenue sharing 
policy does not reflect the underlying work that goes into inventorship. 
To be a joint inventor, and thus joint owner of a patent, one must 
contribute to at least one claim of a patent. Under an equal sharing 
policy, a joint inventor might then contribute a minor component of the 
invention but receive as much money from the patent licensing as the 
main invention developer. Additionally, the revenue sharing policy of 
the Bayh-Dole Act has been theorized to be about invention disclosure 
rather than pure compensation for assignment of the patent ownership.103 
University employees are required to assign patent rights as part of their 
terms of employment; therefore, the necessity of paying each joint 
inventor equally to compensate for ownership rights is abrogated. 
A second distribution sharing policy for revenue distribution would 
be based on inventive input. Under an inventive input policy, university 
TTOs or joint inventors would determine how much each inventor 
contributed to the final invention and distribute revenue based on that 
contribution. This policy reflects the work that each inventor contributes 
and ignores the equal ownership issues described above. Difficulties 
may arise under this policy due to a lack of understanding regarding 
what an inventive step actually entails as described above. Additionally, 
conception does not equate to the amount of hands on work that an 
individual may have contributed to the project resulting in the 
invention—making understanding of the revenue distribution harder for 
the joint inventors to understand. Furthermore, due to the nature of the 
patent prosecution process, patent application amendments may change 
the relative inventive input over the course of the application process. A 
 103.  See, e.g., Martin Kenney & Donald Patton, Reconsidering the Bayh-Dole Act and the 
Current University Invention Ownership Model, 38 RES. POL’Y 1407, 1413 (2009) (“The literature 
suggests that the best way to encourage disclosure on the part of university employees is to increase 
their share of the invention’s income.”). 
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joint inventor at disclosure may no longer be a named inventor once the 
patent issues if her contribution is deemed unpatentable. These 
difficulties can be alleviated with an increased emphasis on education by 
the TTO. 
A third revenue distribution policy would be for the joint inventors 
to decide the split amongst themselves. The advantage of this policy is 
that it allows the inventors the autonomy to determine what they believe 
to be an equitable distribution. However, this autonomy is also the 
failing of this policy. As noted above, the lack of education as to what is 
an inventive contribution will be exacerbated by the negotiation power 
imbalance inherent in the laboratory structure. Additionally, the 
problems associated with the second policy will also exist but without an 
incentive for the TTO to lead an educational effort. 
A final major revenue distribution policy option would be to give a 
set minimum percentage to the PI of the laboratory when she is an 
inventor in recognition of the underlying contribution that the PI makes 
to all work that occurs in the laboratory. A university could well decide 
that the PI should receive a minimum of a fifty percent revenue share 
because the PI leads the funding efforts of the laboratory as well as the 
mentorship of members of the laboratory. This approach recognizes that 
one of the underlying motivations for the revenue sharing provision is 
disclosure. Having a PI who is invested in the technology-transfer 
system increases the odds of disclosure over the long term because the 
other members of the laboratory are likely to leave the university after a 
few years. However, if the invention is developed primarily by other 
members of the laboratory, those members are likely to feel the revenue 
sharing is not entirely equitable. 
Therefore, this approach would require extensive initial amounts of 
education by the TTO to explain why the PI received a large automatic 
share. The policy would also need to be supplemented by a secondary 
policy as described above in order to determine how the remaining 
revenue should be distributed. However, allocating a large share directly 
to the PI may result in less pressure by the PI on the other joint inventors 
during negotiations as the PI will have received her (perceived earned) 
large share. This policy may reflect ownership or inventorship in the 
secondary policy depending on the university’s decisions. 
There are numerous variations on these basic revenue distribution 
policies. The timing of the joint inventor determination may be made at 
various points in the process from disclosure to licensing to patent 
issuance. The entity making the determination of inventorship 
percentage could be joint inventors, the TTO, an independent patent 
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attorney or a separate standing committee. The university might also 
give weight to license agreement in determining the revenue distribution 
amongst joint inventors. If a relatively minor portion of the invention is 
the driving force behind a license negotiation, that inventor could 
receive a relatively larger portion of the proceeds than the base policy 
might allow. Each of these variations will have benefits and drawbacks 
that each university will have to weigh in light of its own process. These 
policies do generally require significant input from the TTO. 
Additionally, each of these policies may result in the joint inventors 
disagreeing with the revenue allocation outcome. Some policies may 
result from disagreement amongst inventors while others may result 
from an inventor doubting the determination of a non-inventor arbiter. In 
any case, the university should have a dispute resolution policy in place 
for such disagreement. The method of the process will vary based on the 
type of the initial policy and is beyond the scope of this Article. 
One revenue distribution policy that no university should ever 
adopt is to ignore the contributions of non-faculty inventors. The Bayh-
Dole Act does not distinguish different types of joint inventors104 and 
requires that all inventors receive a portion of the revenues from 
licensing the patent. Therefore, universities should carefully consider 
both revenue distribution policies that include all joint inventors as well 
as educational programs that allow those policies the greatest chance of 
working. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The issues that arise early in the technology-transfer process that 
impact disclosure and inventor determination become important again 
later in the process. After licensing, revenue allocation requires 
university technology-transfer offices to confront many of the same 
issues that caused problems throughout the process. 
University policies may not be aligned with the goals and interests 
of all parties. Harvard’s policy required all joint inventors to agree to a 
revenue sharing agreement or default to an equal division of the 
royalties. It is unlikely that all inventors contribute equally to an 
invention or that faculty inventors perceive the non-faculty contributions 
as being substantial. These attitudes combined with a negotiation power 
imbalance in favor of the favor inventors leaves many graduate students 
with little to do other than agree with the PI. 
 104.  Except the CFR does distinguish federal employee joint inventors. See, e.g., 37 C.F.R. § 
401.14(k)(2) (2016). 
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There are many options for revenue distribution policies amongst 
joint inventors. More research into university technology-transfer 
policies with regards to revenue sharing allocations and dispute 
resolutions is required in order for universities to mindfully execute this 
stage of the technology-transfer process. 
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